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IV. KANT’S SPACE AND MODERN MATHEMATICS.
(38)
The remarkable modern speculations concerning non-Euclidean sorts of space,
of which Prof. Helmholtz gave some account in No. III. of Mind, are likely
to be hailed as one of the chief difficulties with which the Kantian theory of
space will have to deal. “If we can imagine such spaces of other sorts,” that
learned writer tells us, “it cannot be maintained that the axioms of geometry
are necessary consequences of an a priori transcendental form of intuition, as
Kant thought”.
Before attempting to answer this argument, let me briefly point out a fun-
damental error that appears to hinder many adepts of positive science from
realising the true nature of problems belonging to the theory of knowledge, or
critical metaphysics.
In our wanderings on the border between science and philosophy we are apt
to forget that it is impossible to move on both sides of the boundary line at once,
and that whoever crosses it shifts his problem as well as his method. In physics
(taking the word in its widest sense) we must adopt a standard of truth, which in
philosophy is the very thing to be settled. When a sufficient amount of accurate
observation has been digested by correct reasoning, we hold the result to be the
adequate expression of real existence. We admit a real world, independent of all
appearance to anybody’s sense or reason, and take for its exact counterpart the
world that offers itself to the mens sana in corpore sano after exhausting all
the means of research at the command of mankind. Science has no suspicion of (39)
a distinction between ‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’.
2Of course the object of science is not altogether the same with that of popular
belief. In every-day life we consider as real objects such things as appear to our
senses, corrected by reasoning in the rough, as the blue firmament, the earth at
rest, &c. In science the real object is what appears to be to the experienced
mind attaining the very limit of its powers, and sensible phenomena sink into
mere signs of the presence of certain objects. By interpretation of these signs the
real object is attained. And if many a theory of the present day will probably
be modified by ulterior investigation, still we are moving towards the end of
representing the real object as it is.
Yet the real object of science has so much at least in common with that
of ordinary life as is wanted for the purposes of measuring and calculation. It
retains the space and time, the motion and, to a certain extent, even the matter
and force of popular belief. It is not the object of pure thought, evolved from
principles presupposed by necessity in every act of thinking, but of thought as
applied to data of sense. However simplified by abstraction, it always bears the
traces of its sensible origin.
In geometry proper, or constructive geometry (including stereometry), a great
many qualities of things are disregarded, while it only attends to the space in
which bodies appear to exist and move. But, however shorn, of qualities, its
object is imagined as something to a certain extent analogous to what we see
and touch. Hence its teachings may be assisted by diagrams and models, not
mere conventional signs like those of arithmetic or logic. Because it takes from
sense-intuition only the very first data, which are the same whatever part of
our experience we proceed from, it assumes the aspect of a purely deductive
science like arithmetic. Nevertheless its empirical basis may be shown by its
inability to construct, for instance, an aggregate of four dimensions. Its real
object is that of physics and of common life, considered exclusively as to the
metrical proportions of figures imaginable in its space. To demand logical proof
for genuine geometrical axioms is a mistake, because every proof must proceed
from some ultimate premisses, which in this case must concern space. There are
no data about space either in logic or arithmetic, but only in our sense-intuition,
and precisely the data expressed in those axioms.
The algebraical geometry of modern science is algebra, a more general form
of arithmetic, a series of speculations concerning quantities. Its sole connection
with geometry is the understanding that the quantities it considers are meant
as quantities of geometrical data; but this understanding is not embodied in the (40)
algebraical symbols themselves. As we learn from Prof. Helmholtz (l.c. p. 309),
time as well as a line may be regarded here as an aggregate of one dimension,
and the system of colours as an aggregate of three dimensions. The formulae
and their analysis remain the same whether the aggregates be assumed to be
spatial ones or of a different nature. Hence it is possible to pursue the chain of
inference far beyond the limits of any geometrical interpretation, and even, by
varying the premisses in which we express certain geometrical data, to prepare
3formulas that would apply to spaces foreign to our experience, provided any
such could be conceived by the human imagination. The proof in this case is
entirely logical: supposing certain relations of quantities, certain other relations
must be admitted also, or there would be an end to all our thinking. However,
the link between such a system of inferences and its application to qualities of
either objective or assumed space is not comprehended in the system itself, but
supplied from without, and it remains to be seen how much of the algebraical
system, will bear translation into geometry.
Now, when we aim at a theory of knowledge and enter into discussion with
such thinkers as Berkeley, Hume or Kant, we find ourselves on a ground quite
different from that of either physics or geometry. The notions of ‘objectivity’ and
‘reality,’ hitherto equivalent, must be carefully kept asunder, or else it becomes
impossible even to understand the questions at issue. We must be prepared to
examine opinions like these: that there is nothing real except mind, whereas
space and bodies are merely its object; or that besides mind there is a reality,
impressing it so as to produce an object wholly dissimilar from the reality itself.
Again, if admitting impressions from without, we may have to enquire in how far
the object is dependent on these and on the constitution of the mind respectively.
If it were established beyond all doubt that the ‘object’ and the ‘real’ are one
and the same, all examination of such questions and theories would become
an empty ceremony, and the paradoxes of Idealism absurdities unworthy of our
notice. But as things are now, results of scientific research involving that as-
sumption cannot be rightly employed as evidence against philosophical tenets
that disclaim its validity.
For a scientific man fresh from physiology of the senses, it is hard to keep in
mind that the perceiving, imagining and thinking ‘subject’ of philosophy is not
altogether the same as that with which he had to deal in his former pursuits.
There he considered it as a unity of body and mind, one of a class of objects
in the world we observe. Here, it is nothing more than the correlative of every (41)
object whatever, the observer and thinker opposed to them all. Unaccustomed to
this kind of abstraction, the student of nature speedily-rounds it off into the full
anthropos of physiology, not being aware that he has crossed the fatal border;
and much of the reasoning current in his own domain is no longer acceptable as
lawful tender.
From geometry proper, there is an easy transit into metaphysics, by the road
of analytical geometry, which science has but a conventional connection with
the data of intuition, and merges into pure arithmetic. In order to determine
the relations between construction and analysis, some will attempt to reduce the
latter to an abstraction from the sensible object like geometry, while others try
to explain the foundations of geometry as necessities of thought unassisted by
the senses. Both theories belong to the province of Philosophy; but from the
familiar intercourse between mathematics and natural science, it is evident that
Science has a great chance of being called in as arbiter and usurping the office
4without suspicion.
In the present case, the first question is whether any sort of space besides the
space of Euclid be capable of being imagined. More than three dimensions, it
is allowed, we are quite unable to represent. But we are told of spherical and
pseudospherical space, and non-Euclideans exert all their powers to legitimate
these as space by making them imaginable. We do not find that they succeed in
this, unless the notion of imaginability be stretched far beyond what Kantians
and others understand by the word. To be sure, it is easy to imagine a spherical
surface as a construction in Euclid’s space; but we vainly attempt to get an
intuition of a solid standing in the same relation to that surface as our own
solids stand to the plane. A pseudospherical surface we may imagine; but then
it is bounded by one or two edges. Nor is it of any avail to draw (as we are
told) a piece from the edge back to the middle, and then continue it. This very
operation betrays that the continuity of such a surface beyond the edge is not
imaginable. We may cloak our perplexity by special phrases, saying that only
limited strips of the surface can be “connectedly represented in our space,” while
it may yet be “thought of as infinitely continued in all directions”. The former is
just what is commonly understood by being ‘imagined,’ whereas being ‘thought
of’ does not imply imagination any more than in the case of, say,
√−1. And when
we are assured that Beltrami has rendered relations in pseudospherical space of
three dimensions imaginable by a process which substitutes straight lines for
curves, planes for curved surfaces, and points on the surface of a finite sphere
for infinitely distant points, we might as well believe that a cone is rendered (42)
sufficiently imaginable to a pupil by merely showing its projection upon a plane
as a circle or a triangle. Just the characteristic features of the thing we are to
imagine must be done away with, and all we are able to grasp with our intuition
is a translation of that thing into something else. As to the image in a convex
mirror, referred to by Prof. Helmholtz in his article, we do not mentally contrast
it with our objective world in Euclidean space, but only with the habitual aspect
of that world as seen from a given point of view. In the latter also things appear
to contract as they retire to a distance. Only we have learned to conceive the
objective space as one in which we ourselves are able to move in all directions
and shift our point of view at pleasure. So with some practice we actually see
those things not growing smaller, but moving away from the place where we
may happen to be. The world in the mirror offers itself as a novel aspect of the
same world, needing a larger amount of practice for its interpretation, because
complicated by unwonted circumstances. As a form of the objective world, which
remains the same from whatever point we inspect it, we can imagine, not any
space in which motion implies flattening or change of form of any kind, but only
the space known from our sense-experience, the space of Euclid. All other ‘space’
contrived by human ingenuity may be an aggregate with fictitious properties and
a consistent algebraical analysis of its own, but space it is called only by courtesy.
5Even admitting for a moment that our mind is capable of imagining dif-
ferent sorts of space, it might still be maintained that the only possible form
of actual intuition for a mind like ours, as affected by real things outside
of it, is Euclidean space. When we hold the origin of our geometrical axioms
to be empirical, it does not follow that a real space must be assumed as be-
ing transported in some way through organs of sense into the percipient mind.
Of experience itself there are different explanations, as far as explanations go.
Granted that I take my ‘flat space’ from my perceptions, and these are forced
upon me by something not myself, variety of perceptions ought to originate in
a variety of outward impulses. But then perception may be, for aught I know,
wholly dissimilar in nature from both the impulse and that which produced the
impulse, as the perception of red or blue is believed to be the effect of certain
undulations in the optic nerve, produced in their turn by the waves termed light,
and yet not to be compared with either. Our intuition of space may be empirical
without a real space to correspond, provided there be any reality whatever com-
pelling the mind to exert its native powers in constructing space as we know it, (43)
which the mind would not do unless so compelled. In that case space, Euclid’s
space, would remain a form of intuition, a priori and transcendental.
We read that “geometrical axioms must vary according to the kind of space
inhabited”. Why this must be, one cannot understand, unless it be proved
first, which is not proved at all, that space as represented by a sentient being is
necessarily a copy of a space in which it lives and moves. Even if we suppose
that the subject resides in a real space, and that its intuitions of space depend
entirely on what it perceives, the question remains, how much of its perception
is due to the constitution of the subject itself, and how much to impressions
from the outer world? Also, what is the relation between those impressions
and the spatial arrangement of that world? The space represented on the faith
of perception might yet be different from the real space. Nay, on the popular
empirical ground taken by physiology, the proposition is a disputable one. Dr.
Mises (Prof. Fechner), in one of his witty paradoxes of thirty years ago, reprinted
last year in his Kleine Schriften, supposed reasoning beings of two dimensions
only, like the men we see in the camera obscura, who move together with the
plane which they inhabit through a third dimension, and perceive that movement
only as a continued series of changes in their superficial universe. By analogy he
started the hypothesis of a fourth dimension through which we might be moving
our- selves. Now we know that analytical geometry is ready to grapple with any
number of dimensions,1 though they can never be imagined. These plane-people
of Mises are quite as imaginable as the sphere-dwellers of Prof. Helmholtz. They
would really exist in a space of three dimensions, inhabiting two of them and
moving through the third, yet perceiving but two of them as dimensions. So
would the sphere-dwellers; for the surface of a sphere means either nothing at
1Cf. the Ausdehnungslehre of Hermann Grassmann.
6all, or the boundary of a solid of three dimensions. Only in their case the third
dimension would influence their intuition by preventing them, for instance, from
ever gathering experience of parallel lines and geometrical similarity between
figures of different size.2 However, as our mathematicians succeed in explaining
properties of spaces unknown to. our experience, even of those of four and more (44)
dimensions, there is no reason to deny the same faculty to our imaginary surface-
men. As all straightest lines on a sphere end by meeting somewhere, why should
they not for once suppose a different surface, on which straightest lines might be
drawn in any direction so as to retain the same distance to infinity, and, reasoning
on this and a few more suppositions, discover the analytical geometry of the
plane? Combining this with their original spherical theorems, some genius among
them might conceive the bold hypothesis of a third dimension, and demonstrate
that actual observations are perfectly explained by it. Henceforth there would be
a double set of geometrical axioms; one the same as ours, belonging to science,
and another resulting from experience in a spherical surface only, belonging to
daily life. The latter would express the ‘object’ of sense-intuition; the former,
‘reality,’ incapable of being represented in empirical space, but perfectly capable
of being thought of and admitted by the learned as real, albeit different from the
space inhabited.
The ‘rigidity’ ascribed to geometrical figures is hardly to be considered as a
physical quality. A physical solid, say an india-rubber ball, may be thought of
as being flattened to a spheroid or a disc, and still retain its identity, because
the matter remains the same. It would be perfectly rigid in a physical sense, if
its form were unchangeable by any external force whatever. But a geometrical
sphere is the same only as long as both its form and size remain what they
are. The rigidity is not resistance against force, but simple identity with itself.
We might conceive a spheroid of the same volume, and an unbroken series of
spheroids between it and the sphere; so by analogy with the physical body we
might say that the sphere was gradually flattened to the ultimate form in the
series. Still in the geometrical sense there would be no identity between the
sphere and any of the spheroids, because here matter is wanting, but only a
successive substitution of something else instead of the primitive figure. If we
apply one sphere to another, and find out their congruence or the reverse, the
meaning is not that a physically rigid body is to be transported through all the
ntervening parts of space. The purpose is answered as well by mentally cancelling
the old sphere, and constructing a new one on the same principle and with the
same radius, so that its centre coincide with that of the sphere to be compared
with it. In the case of mechanical science deciding that- two bodies must have
2Unless, indeed, they were small enough to perceive only a very limited portion of their
surface, which might easily impress them as flat, as our earth did the first Greek philosophers.
We need not stop to inquire whether we ourselves ever get sense-experience of undoubtedly
parallel lines. Nevertheless such are constructible out of primary elements supplied by sense-
intuition.
7varied in the same sense during such an operation, the inference would be that
the consequences of geometrical application of figures to each other can never be
verified by actual experience on physical bodies for that reason, to say nothing (45)
of their impenetrability. But geometry would declare bodies liable to vary, to be
different from its own solids. Of course, its own abstract notions of space and
figure may be supplemented at pleasure by taking into account time of movement,
or a concept of matter just sufficient to distinguish a filled part of space from
an empty one. In the former case we come to phoronomy, in the latter to mixed
geometrical speculations about bodies capable of contractions and distensions.
Such speculations are as lawful as what most people understand by geometry,
and it appears that physicists find them useful for their ulterior purposes. Only
they must not be confounded with the doctrine of space and its measures, in
which a solid is simply a part of space of a certain form and size, a surface the
boundary between such parts and so on. These parts of space it would be absurd
to consider as changeable, whatever experience may affirm concerning physical
bodies that move in space. It is certainly true in one sense, that the axioms of
geometry “merely define what qualities and deportment a body must have to
be recognised as rigid”. But this regards geometry as applicable to bodies or
material things; its own solids are not meant either to have or to lack physical
rigidity.
Nevertheless geometrical axioms are synthetic propositions, because they are
not to be deduced by pure logic from the definition of their subject-terms, but
are found by intuition of the space offered to us as a form of our objective world.
As far as we know, that world and its space could be quite different from what
they are, were it not for sense-experience which supplies the first elements of
construction, and reflection which constructs figures and examines them as if
actually seen. The axioms of geometry proper are discoveries resulting from
the contemplation of objective space by itself; as soon as we add the empirical
elements of movement, properly so called, of bodies filling space, &c., we stand
upon another ground.
To conclude these observations, the Kantian, theory of space, as defined by
Prof. Helmholtz himself, contains three distinct assertions: —
(a.) Space is a form of intuition: any conception of ours must; be imag-
inable to be what we call space. [This is admitted by the opponents; only,
non-Euclideans try to make imaginable that which is not so in the sense required
for argumentation in this case.]
(b.) Space is a form a priori: a native form of our perceptive faculty,
not a datum passively received from without. [The opponents attempt to refute
this by proving the empirical origin of our notions of space.. Between this proof
and the refutation of Kant’s assertion there is wanting the proof that empiri- (46)
cal knowledge is acquired by simple importation or by counterfeit, and not by
peculiar operations of the mind solicited by varied impulses from an unknown
8reality.]
(c.) Space is a transcendental form: belonging to our own object by some
necessity arising from the unknown constitution of our mind; but not therefore
belonging to the real world as well. [The opponents overlook the distinction
between ‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’, and reason, as they would do in physical
science, on the tacit supposition of the two being identical, and Kant’s assertion
disproved beforehand.]
After this, the final propositions of the article in question would have to be
modified as follows : —
(1.) The axioms of geometry, taken by themselves out of all connection with
mechanical propositions, represent no relations of physical objects. When strictly
isolated, if we regard them with Kant as forms of intuition transcendentally
given, they contribute a form into which any empirical content whatever will
fit, and which therefore does not in any way limit or determine beforehand the
nature of that content. In other words, axioms concerning parts of space do not
determine the deportment of bodies filling such parts at a given moment. We
may admit that this would hold true if the axioms given were those of spherical
or pseudospherical geometry; however, the (possibly transcendental) . form of
intuition actually given.is that analysed in Euclid’s axioms.
(2.) As soon as certain principles of mechanics are conjoined with the axioms
of geometry, we obtain a system of propositions which has full objective or phys-
ical import, and which can be verified or overturned by fresh sense-observations,
as from sense-experience it can be inferred. If such a system were to be taken
as a transcendental form of intuition and thought, there must be assumed a
constancy of laws determining the relations between the mind’s objects and the
impulses which it receives from an unknown reality.
J. P. N. Land.
Leyden, Sept. 30,1876.
